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VACANT PROMISES?: THE ALI PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION AND THE POST-DIVORCE FINANCIAL
CIRCUMSTANCES OF WOMEN
PENELOPE EILEEN BRYAN*
I.  INTRODUCTION
Certainly, the law of family dissolution needs reformation.1  Marriage dis-
solution all too frequently devastates women and their dependent children fi-
nancially,2 and financial deprivation precipitates a broad range of social prob-
lems and squanders societal resources.3  Many feminists argue for laws that
increase women’s access to financial resources at divorce.4 Others encourage re-
forms that level the playing field between divorcing husbands and wives, hop-
ing to improve the substance of negotiated separation agreements.5  With this
feminist agenda as a backdrop, this commentary evaluates the American Law
Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution pertaining to spousal mainte-
nance (hereinafter Maintenance Principles)6, property distribution (hereinafter
Property Principles)7, child custody (hereinafter Custody Principles)8, and sepa-
ration agreements (hereinafter Agreement Principles)9 and concludes that they
Copyright © 2001 by Penelope Eileen Bryan.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Denver.
1. Nearly all who study family dissolution or work within the field agree that systemic reform
must occur.  But here agreement ends and controversy begins.  Political factions offer dramatically
different goals for reform.  Compare Penelope Eileen Bryan, Women’s Freedom to Contract at Divorce: A
Mask for Contextual Coercion, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1153, 1193-94 & nn.187-90 (1999) [hereinafter Freedom]
with Penelope E. Bryan, Reasking the Woman Question at Divorce, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 713, 724-25,
733-42 & nn.107-69 (2000) [hereinafter Reasking] and Leslie Joan Harris, A “Just and Proper Division”:
Property Distribution at Divorce in Oregon, 78 OR. L. REV. 735, 737 (1999).
2. Freedom, supra note 1, at 1155 nn.14, 19 & 20, 1204 & nn.236-37; Reasking, supra note 1, at 713.
3. Freedom, supra note 1, at 1155-69; Reasking, supra note 1, at 755-61. 
4. Freedom, supra note 1, at 1210 n.256; Reasking, supra note 1, at 754-55.
5. PENELOPE EILEEN BRYAN, RECONSTRUCTION JUSTICE IN DIVORCE: PROCEDURAL AND
SUBSTANTIVE REFORM (forthcoming 2002).
6. ALI PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ch.
5 (Proposed Final Draft Part I, 1997) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES 1997].
7. Id. at ch. 4.
8. ALI PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ch.
2 (Tentative Draft No. 3 Part 1, 1998) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES 1998]; ALI PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW
OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ch. 2 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2000)
[hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES 2000].
9. ALI PRINCIPLES 2000, supra note 8, at ch. 7.
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do little to alleviate the post-divorce financial distress experienced by women
and their dependent children.10
The ALI’s Maintenance and Property Principles do not explicitly attempt to
improve the post-divorce financial circumstances of women and children.11
Rather they aspire to foster predictable results by restricting judicial discretion.12
Limiting the discretion of judges who typically discriminate against women on
financial issues, could foster better results for divorcing women.  The Mainte-
nance Principles, for instance, provide standardized formulas for determining
spousal maintenance (compensatory payments)13 that might make these awards
both more likely and more adequate.14  The presumption the Property Principles
afford in favor of an equal distribution of marital assets15 may provide most
women with at least half of the marital property at dissolution.  The gradual
conversion of separate property into marital property in long-term marriages16
also offers women access to financial resources few states now provide.17
Many mothers trade away their financial rights at divorce in order to
maintain custody of their children.18  The Custody Principles offer a presump-
tion that allocates custodial responsibility for children in proportion to the care-
taking functions each parent previously performed for the child.19  Under this
standard, a caretaking mother would presumably have some assurance of re-
taining most of the custodial responsibility for the children,20 making her less
likely to trade-off important financial resources for the amount of custody she
desires.
On their surface, the above proposals seem to promise better financial re-
sults for women and children than the current system now generates.  Moreo-
ver, the consistency and predictability they offer at trial should strengthen
women’s position in divorce negotiations.21  On closer inspection, however, I
suspect they will only marginally improve the post-divorce financial circum-
stances of only a few women and children.  Section II explores the conceptual
10. In contrast, the Principles’ proposals regarding child support make several meaningful
changes in existing law.  See generally ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 8.  For example, Section
3.16(2)(a) requires parents with the financial ability to support their children through college, gradu-
ate school, and professional training.  Id. at 124.
11. In this article, I take the position, well-supported by social science data, that the financial
distress and decline of the residential parent necessarily and negatively affects the children.  See
Freedom, supra note 1, at 1157-65.
12. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, § 4.02(3); ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 8, at 11, 13; see
also J. Thomas Oldham, ALI Principles of Family Dissolution: Some Comments, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 801,
802 (1997).
13. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6,  §§ 5.05, 5.06, 5.12, 5.15, 5.16.  
14. Presumably judges would follow the law.  Predictable results at trial likely influence settle-
ment outcomes as well.
15. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, § 4.15.
16. Id. § 4.18.
17. In all but very few states, a spouse’s separate property remains separate throughout the
marriage and at divorce.  Id.
18. Freedom, supra note 1, at 1201.  
19. ALI PRINCIPLES 2000, supra note 8, § 2.09(1).
20. See infra notes 126-39 and accompany text for further assessment.
21. See supra text accompanying notes 11-20.
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and substantive problems found in the Maintenance Principles.  Section III ex-
amines the Property Principles and finds conceptual and substantive problems
similar to those found in the Maintenance Principles.  Section IV explains why
the Custody Principles fail to discourage women from compromising their fi-
nancial interests in order to secure custody of their children.  Section V explores
the reasons why the Agreement Principles’ deference to separation agreements
significantly undermines women’s financial interests at divorce.
II.  SPOUSAL MAINTENANCE AS COMPENSATORY PAYMENTS
Current law and its application contribute to the post-divorce financial de-
cline of women and children.22  In order to improve this situation, the law must
change radically and provide divorcing women greater access to income and
property.23  Yet the Maintenance Principles often justify specific provisions by
noting that they mimic current statutes or decisional patterns reflected in
caselaw.24  For instance, the Maintenance Principles change the justification for
spousal maintenance from “need” to “loss”25 and label payments “compensatory
awards”26 rather than “spousal maintenance.”  They note that this reconceptu-
alization leads to laws that reflect the award patterns commonly found in exist-
ing caselaw.27  This conservative approach of linking reform to existing spousal
maintenance patterns does not offer the more radical reforms necessary for real
improvement.
The focus on “loss” also fosters a narrow vision of entitlement.  The Main-
tenance Principles acknowledge only the standard of living an individual loses
after a long-term marriage28 or the individual’s reduced earning capacity due to
caretaking responsibilities.29  The wife’s household labor that facilitated the hus-
band’s ideal worker status30 becomes conceptually peripheral, weakening the
justification for her entitlement to a share of his post-divorce income.  A more
comprehensive justification would recognize that spouses (frequently wives)31
who perform the bulk of marital labor32 suffer losses33 and make contributions34
22. Freedom, supra note 1, at 1191-1239.  
23. BRYAN, supra note 5.
24. See, e.g., ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, § 5.03 cmt. c.; ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 9,
at 8.
25. ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 8, at 8-9; ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 7, § 5.02.
26. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, § 5.03.
27. Id.
28. Id. §§ 5.03(2)(a), 5.05.
29. Id. §§ 5.03(2)(b), (c), 5.06, 5.12.
30. Williams describes how wives tend to sacrifice their own market participation in order to
facilitate the ideal worker status of their husbands.  Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New
Theory of Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2227, 2236-67 (1994).  Williams also explains that even in two career
families, couples commonly engage in a game of “chicken” over who will provide housekeeping and
child care services.  Due to her socialization that accords high priority to homemaking and child
care, the wife typically loses this game and performs most of these functions.  Id. at 2240-41.
31. See, e.g., Scott Coltrane, Research on Household Labor: Modeling and Measuring the Social Em-
beddedness of Routine Family Work, 62 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1208 (2000).
32. See  id; Williams, supra note 30, at 2245-47 n.91.
33. Williams notes that wives who interrupt their careers lose an average of 1.5% of income for
each year they do not participate in market labor, with college-educated wives losing as much as
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that entitle them to a share of their husbands’ post-divorce income.  The com-
ments to the Maintenance Principles explicitly reject this contribution justifica-
tion.35  They acknowledge that undoubtedly “some” cases support a factual
finding that the wife contributed to her husband’s earning capacity.36  But other
cases, they claim, do not support such a finding.37  They argue that if the Main-
tenance Principles adopted a contribution justification for all cases, awards in
many cases would lack a factual foundation.38
The above rationale for rejecting a contribution justification is troubling for
three reasons.  First, it ignores a substantial body of research indicating that
women today still perform at least twice as much routine housework as men,39
with the average woman still performing about three times the amount of rou-
tine housework as the average man.40  Presumably in the typical, rather than the
rare household, the wife’s services provide the husband with more hours in his
day to devote to work or leisure, both of which may enhance his workforce per-
formance.41  Consequently I suspect most rather than some cases would provide a
factual foundation that supports a maintenance award based on a contribution
justification.  Second, the Principles justify many of its proposals based on as-
sumptions the drafters make regarding human behavior and expectations.42
Many of these assumptions lack empirical verification and likely will lack a
factual basis in many cases.  I fail to understand the drafters’ reluctance to take a
less speculative leap of faith regarding the contribution justification for spousal
maintenance.  Third, theoretical justifications for spousal maintenance prove es-
pecially critical, because the Maintenance Principles defer to the states to de-
velop many of the specific rules that govern the availability and amount of
compensatory payments.43  Presumably a stronger justification than loss would
4.3%.  Id. at 2257 n.148  (citing Jacob Mincer & Solomon Polachek, Family Investments in Human Capi-
tal: Earnings of Women, in ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY 395 (Theodore W. Schultz ed., 1974)).  See also
Elizabeth Smith Beninger & Jeanne Wielage Smith, Career Opportunity Cost: A Factor in Spousal Sup-
port Determinations, 16 FAM. L.Q. 201, 207 (1982); Jacob Mincer & Solomon Polachek, Family Invest-
ment in Human Capital: Earnings of Women, 82 J. POL. ECON. 576, 583 (1974).  Estin reports a more re-
cent study that found a typical wage gap of 33% the first year women returned to work, with a only
a portion of that gap made up over time.  Ann Laquer Estin, Maintenance, Alimony, and the Rehabilita-
tion of Family Care, 71 N.C. L. REV. 721, 746 n.87 (1993) (discussing a study by Laurence Levin and
Joyce Jacobsen and citing Laura Myers, Women Who Interrupt Career Fall Into Pay Gap, BOULDER
DAILY CAMERA, Jan. 11, 1992, at 1A, 11A).
34. Williams, supra note 30.  
35. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, § 5.05 cmt. c.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See Coltrane, supra note 31 (reviewing more than 200 scholarly articles and books on house-
hold labor published between 1989 and 1999).
40. Id. at 1212.
41. The household version of the economic theory of human capital investment posits that men
and women allocate time to household or paid work based on maximizing utility or efficiency.  Id. at
1213.  See generally GARY A. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (1981).  This theory thus suggests a
direct link between the wife’s household tasks and the husband’s workplace performance.
42. See ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 7, § 4.18 cmt. a (offering justification for recharacteriza-
tion of separate property).
43. Id. §§ 5.05(2), (3), 5.06(2), 5.06(4), 5.07(1), 5.12(2).
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generate specific rules more favorable to dependent spouses.  Moreover, a justi-
fication based on contribution might lead to distribution rules quite different
from the patterns found in existing case law that the Maintenance Principles
claim to reflect.44
The Maintenance Principles offer specific formulas for determining the en-
titlement to45 and the amount46 and duration47 of spousal maintenance.  These
formulas limit judicial discretion, the exercise of which has historically provided
wives with inadequate maintenance awards.48  While limitations on judicial dis-
cretion may promise to enhance the availability, amount, and duration of
spousal maintenance, the specific formulas offered in the Maintenance Princi-
ples prove problematic.
The Maintenance Principles authorize compensatory payments based on
the parties’ disparate financial capacity when 1) one spouse cannot maintain the
marital living standard without assistance from the other;49 or 2) one spouse has
provided certain types of caretaking.50  Awards based on the inability of one
spouse to maintain the marital living standard, however, require marriages of a
specified duration51 and a financial disparity of a specified amount.52  The Main-
tenance Principles delegate to the states the task of specifying the marital dura-
tion and the financial disparity that would support this type of compensatory
payment.53  In today’s political climate, one can predict that male-dominated
state legislatures will adopt rules that make compensatory payments available,
if at all, only in lengthy marriages and only when a very wide gap exists in the
parties’ respective financial capacities.54  This tendency throughout the Principles
to punt difficult policy decisions to state legislatures severely compromises their
ability to improve the post-divorce financial circumstances of women and their
dependent children.55
44. A maintenance law that recognized the wife’s contribution to her husband’s earning capac-
ity might justify more generous levels of support.  The wife’s potential entitlement to maintenance
also might begin at the date of the marriage, rather than only when the marriage endures for a speci-
fied duration.
45. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, §§ 5.05(2), 5.06(2), 5.15(1).
46. Id.  §§ 5.05(3), 5.06(2), 5.06(4), 5.07(1), 5.12(2), 5.15(4).
47. Id.  § 5.07.
48. Freedom, supra note 1, at 1201-15.
49. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, § 5.05.
50. Id. §§ 5.06, 5.12.  The ALI Principles, in Chapter 5, also provide limited reimbursement for
one spouse’s financial contributions to the other spouse’s education or training, irrespective of a dis-
parity in the spouses’ financial capacity, provided the recipient spouse has no entitlement to other
types of compensatory payments.  Id. § 5.15.
51. Id. §§ 5.05(1), 5.05(2).
52. Id.
53. Id. § 5.05(2).
54. State legislatures seem particularly resistant to spousal maintenance reforms that favor
women.  See Harris, supra note 1, at 737.  The Principles do suggest that state rules should provide
compensatory payments in marriage of five or more years when one spouse’s income exceeds the
claimant’s income by twenty-five percent or more.  They also offer suggestions on how to compute
the value of compensation payments under Section 5.05.  ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, § 5.05.
However, the Principles do not obligate states to adopt any of their suggestions.
55. Perhaps the drafters of Chapter 5 of the ALI Principles deferred to state legislatures on criti-
cal issues in order to make their proposals politically palatable and encourage adoption.  In the long
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Equitable principles supply the rationale for compensatory payments based
on loss of marital living standard and disparity of financial circumstances.  The
Maintenance Principles speak of differential risk, economic exploitation, and ex-
pectation.  The Maintenance Principles, however, arbitrarily limit equitable justi-
fications to long-term marriages.  They explain that wives, especially long-term
homemakers, generally face greater financial risks at the dissolution of marriage
than do their husbands.56  Social patterns suggest that the longer the marriage,
the greater the wife’s economic dependence upon her husband.57  As time passes
the gap widens between the marital living standard and the wife’s earning ca-
pacity, and the wife’s earning capacity becomes more difficult, or impossible, to
recapture.58  Although remarriage might help her reestablish her prior marital
standard of living, marriage patterns of men make remarriage unlikely for older
women.59  The husband, in contrast, typically does not face the same risk of fi-
nancial decline at divorce, and his remarriage prospects exceed those of his
wife.60  Equity, particularly in long-term marriages, suggests that the spouses
should share the risk of financial decline at divorce.61  Compensatory payments
that minimize the decline in the wives’ standard of living also deter the eco-
nomic exploitation of wives by husbands.  Over time the possibility of compen-
satory payments equalizes the financial stake each spouse has in the success of
the marriage, presumably deterring husbands from abandoning older spouses.62
Finally, the longer the marriage the more the wife and husband adjust to the
marital living standard and legitimately expect it to continue.63  The Mainte-
nance Principles conclude then that the marital, rather than the premarital, stan-
dard of living gradually becomes the proper benchmark by which to measure
the appropriate post-divorce financial circumstances of the spouses.64
The above equitable justifications are sensible and sensitive to the financial
dependency patterns found in the vast majority of marriages.65  Limiting this
type of compensatory payment to marriages of a specified duration, however, is
troubling.  I fail to understand why these justifications and others do not sup-
port these awards in all marriages, no matter their duration.  Certainly a wife in
a two year marriage might suffer a differential risk at divorce, having more to
run, however, this deference may cause more harm than good to women.  Left to their own devices,
I suspect that most state legislatures will develop rules of statewide application that substantially
compromise the Principles’ intent to make spousal maintenance more available and adequate.
Moreover the state legislatures will receive political approval for having passed laws that purport to
address the social problems inherent in divorced women’s financial plight.  On the other hand, if the
Maintenance Principles offered their own rules that favored women, state legislatures might well
reject them.  Yet outright rejection undoubtedly would provoke criticism and expose the gender bi-
ased motives of state legislatures, perhaps promoting political unrest and meaningful reform.
56. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, § 5.05 cmt. c.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, § 5.05 cmt. c.
63. Id. § 5.05 cmt. a.
64. Id. § 5.05 cmt. c.
65. Freedom, supra note 1, at 1172-73 & nn.78-82.
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lose at dissolution than her higher earning husband.  The marital, housekeeping,
and caretaking responsibilities she provides typically compromise her
workforce participation,66 increasing her differential risk at divorce.  She may re-
fuse overtime, travel with him more frequently, and prepare his meals and his
laundry.  She even may leave the workforce entirely.  The wife in a short-term
marriage also can develop an expectation interest in the marital living standard
and alter her behavior in reliance upon that expectation.  If she leaves the
workforce entirely, for whatever length of time, her earning capacity declines
permanently,67 making her equitable claim stronger.  Finally, if a husband knows
that the law provides compensatory payments to his wife once their marriage
reaches a specified duration, he may behave opportunistically and leave his wife
just before her entitlement matures.  Thus, the opportunity for exploitation con-
tinues under the Maintenance Principles.  The availability of compensatory
payments for loss of the marital living standard in all marriages would better
eliminate opportunistic behavior and promote marital stability.  Consequently,
given available justifications, a wife in a short-term marriage seems as worthy as
a wife in a long-term marriage to receive compensatory payments based on a
loss in her standard of living.68
The Maintenance Principles attempt to address the above situation by pro-
viding for the restoration of the premarital living standard after a short mar-
riage.69  This provision, however, only partially restores the premarital living
standard70 and only under very limited circumstances.71  The spouse seeking
such an award must prove that her inability to recover her premarital living
standard at dissolution results from significant expenditures she made during
marriage, or in anticipation of marriage, from separate property or from her re-
linquishment of specific educational or occupational opportunities.72  If our hy-
pothetical wife did not leave the workforce, but simply pursued her occupa-
tional development with less zeal, this provision would provide her no relief.  If
she left the workforce entirely, the second requirement causes her trouble.  The
wife must establish that she made the expenditures from her separate property
or relinquished opportunities in order to facilitate the husband’s pursuit of
similar opportunities without undue disruption of marital life, to facilitate the
birth or adoption of children, or to serve a purpose that the spouses agreed con-
tributed to their marital life.73  Here our hypothetical wife must prove that her
leaving the workforce enabled her husband to pursue occupational opportuni-
ties, or facilitated an important goal to which both spouses agreed.  Both of these
66. Id. at 1172.
67. See Williams, supra note 30.
68. She seems even more worthy of such an award if the court considers her “contributions” to
her husband’s market labors as an ideal worker, rather than just her lost earning capacity and differ-
ential risk.
69. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, § 5.16.
70. Id. § 5.16(3).
71. Id. § 5.16(2).
72. Id. § 5.16(2)(a).
73. Id. § 5.16(2)(b).
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provisions invite a potentially expensive and protracted factual fight, a fight she
likely lacks the resources to pursue to the finish.74
Finally the wife must also establish that she cannot recover the expended
assets or that her lost opportunities leave her with a significantly lower earning
capacity than before marriage.75  Thus our hypothetical wife can recover only if
she has withstood the first two requirements and her lost opportunities have re-
sulted in an earning capacity significantly lower than before marriage. The
Maintenance Principles do not define significantly lower earning capacity, pre-
sumably leaving that determination to the discretion of judges who historically
discriminate against women, particularly on financial issues in divorce.76  This
parsimonious provision provides little assistance to wives in short-term mar-
riages, and it does nothing to protect the wife’s expectation interest in the mari-
tal living standard.
In addition to compensatory payments based on loss of the marital living
standard and financial disparity, the Maintenance Principles provide supple-
mental compensatory payments77 when one spouse has performed a dispropor-
tionate share of the care of the marital children or the children of either spouse.78
Section 5.06 recognizes what many state judges and laws ignore: primary care-
takers often limit their workforce participation, resulting in a loss in earning ca-
pacity.79  Section 5.06 seeks to compensate the primary caretaker for his or her
loss in earning capacity due to his or her child caretaking responsibilities.  While
I find the goal laudable, the devil again lies in the details.
Section 5.06 (2) creates a presumption of entitlement when: 1) the marriage
has produced children, or when either spouse has children; 2) these minor chil-
dren have lived with the claimant for a minimum period specified in a rule of
statewide application; and 3) the claimant has a substantially lower earning ca-
pacity than the other spouse.80  The Principles do not define substantially lower
earning capacity, presumably leaving that to judicial discretion.  Allowing
judges with a history of discrimination against women in dissolution cases81 to
decide whether the husband’s earning capacity substantially exceeds his wife’s
promises to defeat the availability of such an award as well as the very predict-
ability the presumption seeks to establish.  Moreover, the other spouse can de-
feat the presumption by establishing that the claimant did not provide substan-
tially more than half of the total care that both spouses together provided for the
74. Freedom, supra note 1, at 1172-78.
75. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, § 5.16(2)(c).
76. Freedom, supra note 1, at 1201-15, 1215-16.
77. A spouse can make a claim for compensatory payments under Sections 5.06 and 5.05.  ALI
PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, § 5.06(5).  In no case, however, can the combined value of the child
care durational factor, and the durational factor employed to determine the presumed award under
Section 5.05, exceed the maximum value allowed for the Section 5.05 durational factor alone.  Id.
78. Id. § 5.06(1).
79. Freedom, supra note 1, at 1211 & nn.258-62.
80. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, § 5.06 (2).
81. Judges seem particularly inept at accurately determining the wife’s financial vulnerability at
divorce.  See also Harris, supra note 1, at 740 (noting the reluctance of lower courts in Oregon to rec-
ognize the value of homemaker contributions to the family economy).
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children.82  This opportunity to rebut the presumption undoubtedly will pre-
cipitate factual disputes,83 particularly in dual-earner households, and legal and
discovery expenses the claimant (usually the wife) cannot afford.  Judges pre-
sumably will resolve these disputes, and judges tend to favor the childcare con-
tributions that fathers make more than those made by mothers.84  The mother’s
limited financial resources and biased judicial discretion suggest that many
mothers will have difficulty triggering the presumption and that the presump-
tion will dissolve in all but the most dramatic cases.  Certainly providing pri-
mary caretakers compensation for lost earning capacity has merit, but the actual
provisions in the Principles likely will not provide this relief to many mothers.
Assuming that a primary caretaker can trigger the presumption and with-
stand an attempt to rebut the presumption, a specific formula determines the
amount of compensatory payments.85  The formula applies a specified percent-
age (the child care durational factor) to the difference in the expected incomes of
the spouses after divorce.86  The Maintenance Principles require the specified
percentage to increase as the childcare period increases.87 The “child care pe-
riod” is the “period during which the claimant provided significantly more than
half of the total care that both spouses together provided for the children.”88  How-
ever, divorce terminates the child care period providing no recognition for the
differential loss in earning capacity the primary residential custodian will expe-
rience after the divorce due to her greater caretaking responsibilities.89  Moreo-
ver, the Maintenance Principles do not offer a formula but again defer to the
states,90 creating the same practical and political problems mentioned above.
Finally, Section 5.07 governs the duration of awards based both on loss of
living standard and on caretaking responsibilities.  Section 5.07(1)(a) provides
for awards of unlimited duration when the age of the claimant and the length of
the marriage both exceed specified minimum values.91  The Principles again defer
to the states to develop these minimum values.92  For compensatory awards
based on standard of living loss, Section 5.07(1)(b) provides for indefinite
82. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, § 5.06(3).
83. The Principles do not define what constitutes child care.  If the father watches television with
the child while the mother does the family laundry, which parent provides child care?  If dad helps
with the math homework while mom cooks the family dinner, which parent provides child care?  If
the father watches the child while the mother does the grocery shopping, which parent provides
child care?  Or do both parents provide child care in the above examples.  Do the mother’s house-
hold tasks, like housecleaning, that indirectly benefit the child constitute child care?  Should a court
attach more merit to particular parental behaviors?  If so, which ones?  The definition of caretaking
function found in the Child Principles does not cure the problem of indefiniteness.  See ALI
PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 8, at § 2.03(6).
84. Freedom, supra note 1, at 1195-97 & nn.197-208.
85. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, § 5.06(4).
86. Id.
87. Id. § 5.06(4)(a).
88. Id. (emphasis added).
89. The child care period equals the entire period during which the relevant minor children
lived in the same household as the claimant.  ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, § 5.06(4)(b).
90. Id. § 5.06(4).
91. Id. § 5.07(1)(a).
92. Id.
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awards and limits their duration to the length of the marriage multiplied by a
specified factor.93  The Principles defer to the states to designate the specific fac-
tor.94  For compensatory awards based on caregiving, Section 5.07(1)(b) provides
for indefinite awards and limits their duration to the length of the child care pe-
riod multiplied by a specified factor.95  The Maintenance Principles do not ex-
plain why the payments should not continue for the entire duration of the child
care period.  Further, the Maintenance Principles fail to explain why compensa-
tory awards based on the primary caretaker’s loss of earning capacity should
terminate at all.  If one parent has compromised workforce participation in or-
der to provide childcare, she likely never will recover her reduction in earning
capacity.96  Finally, the Maintenance Principles defer to the states to designate
the specific factor,97 creating the obvious problem of deferring to male-
dominated legislatures to develop critical rules.
In sum, the Maintenance Principles heroically attempt to create uniform
and predictable law.  Yet they build in judicial discretion at critical junctures
that compromises this attempt.  Substantively they suffer from a conservative
linkage to existing patterns of judicial behavior, deference to state legislatures on
critical issues, and refusal (without convincing justification) to extend compen-
satory payments to short as well as long-term marriages.  The Property Princi-
ples offer even less potential to improve the post-divorce financial circumstances
of women.
III.  PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION
The Property Principles adopt a presumption in favor of an equal distribu-
tion of marital property.98 While this presumption limits judicial discretion,
many equitable distribution states already employ a presumption in favor of an
equal distribution of marital assets.99  Many judges, however, continue to exer-
cise their discretion and award wives less than half of the marital property.100  In
contrast to this judicial pattern, under the Property Principles only the economic
fault of a spouse justifies an unequal division.101  Consequently, judicial applica-
tion of the Property Principles likely will result in an equal division of marital
property far more frequently than judicial application of current law.  While
equal division might enhance the financial circumstances of some divorcing
93. Id. § 5.07(1)(b).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See Williams, supra note 30.
97. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, § 5.07(1)(b).
98. Id. § 4.15(1).
99. See Marsha Garrison, How Do Judges Decide Divorce Cases? An Empirical Analysis of Discretion-
ary Decision Making, 74 N.C. L. REV. 401, 452-58 (1996); Suzanne Reynolds, The Relationship of Prop-
erty Division and Alimony: The Division of Property to Address Need, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 827 (1988).
100. See Freedom, supra note 1, at 1216 & n.286.
101. See ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, §§ 4.15(2)(b), 4.16; see also Oldham, supra note 12, at
804.
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women, many divorcing couples have little property that the law recognizes as
marital.102  Here the conservative nature of the Property Principles emerges.
The Property Principles passively accept conventional definitions and con-
ceptualizations of marital property.103  Constrained by existing judicial patterns
and the statutory law of the majority of states, the Property Principles exclude
from the concept of marital property, inter alia, occupational licenses and profes-
sional degrees,104 the enhanced earning capacity of spouses acquired during the
marriage,105 and the increase in value of and income from separate property.106
The Property Principles offer weak justifications for these exclusions.  They
explain that most states have rejected such claims.107  They also argue that en-
hanced earning capacity also should not constitute marital property, because an
inequitable result may occur.  Divorce law does not consider property acquired
before the marriage as marital, thus a spouse’s earning capacity prior to mar-
riage remains separate property.  The other spouse, however, might begin
working during marriage, making all of that spouse’s income marital.  While the
above scenario might well produce an inequitable result, nothing prevents the
law from taking the above possibility into account in the actual distribution of
the marital assets.  Moreover, it is difficult to accept that a spouse’s earning ca-
pacity prior to the marriage must remain separate property simply because ex-
isting law labels it separate.
The Property Principles also argue that marital property should not include
earning capacity because under existing law courts cannot modify property
awards.108  An inequitable result may occur if the court makes a property award
based on a spouse’s earning capacity at divorce, that spouse’s income declines
102. See Freedom, supra note 1, at 1216-17 nn.291-92.  A law that requires equal distribution also
eliminates the potential to award more of the marital property to the more economically distressed
spouse, usually the wife.
103. See, e.g., ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 8, § 4.03 cmt. a; Oldham, supra note 12, at 803 (rec-
ognizing that the ALI provisions regarding property distribution comprise a restatement rather than
a serious reform effort).
104.  ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, § 4.07(2).
105. Id. § 4.07(1).  
106. The increase in value of and income from separate property during the marriage are marital
only to the extent they are recharacterized, id. §§ 4.04(1), 4.18(3), or are attributable to either spouse’s
marital labor, id. §§ 4.04(2), 4.05(2).
107. Id. § 4.04 cmt. a.  Oregon provides an instructive example.  In 1993 the Oregon legislature
amended Oregon’s property distribution statute to require courts to consider enhanced earning ca-
pacity as marital property.  The legislature, however, did not extend Oregon’s presumption of an
equal contribution to the acquisition of marital property to the acquisition of enhanced earning ca-
pacity.  Moreover a spouse claiming an interest in the other spouse’s enhanced earning capacity had
to establish that she made a material contribution to the enhancement.  The claimant spouse could
satisfy the requirement of material contribution by showing that, among other things, she contrib-
uted financially or otherwise to the education and training that resulted in the other spouse’s en-
hanced earning capacity.  The contribution had to be substantial and for a prolonged duration.  In
1995 the Oregon legislature amended the statute to “allow” rather than require courts to consider
enhanced earning capacity as marital property.  In 1999 the legislature repealed entirely the portion
of the Oregon property distribution statute pertaining to enhanced earning capacity.  Oregon now
considers enhanced earning capacity relevant only to an award of spousal maintenance.  Leslie Joan
Harris, A “Just and Proper Divison”: Property Distribution at Divorce in Oregon, 78 OR. L. REV. 735, 737
n.9 (1999).
108. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, § 4.07 cmt. a.
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subsequent to divorce, and the court cannot modify the award to reflect the
change in circumstance.  I again agree that this situation might well produce an
inequitable result, but cannot accept that a court cannot modify a property
award based on earning capacity simply because existing law does not provide
that opportunity.
The Principles also refuse to define the increase in value of separate prop-
erty as marital property, noting that most jurisdictions reject this approach.109
Certainly some jurisdictions do label such increases as marital.110  Ignoring the
justifications of these states111 simply because the majority rejects them seems
particularly weak.  Just as with spousal maintenance, this conservative approach
of wrapping reforms around existing law compromises the Property Principles’
ability to alter the financial circumstances of divorced women.
The Property Principles do offer one substantial change in existing law.
Section 4.18 gradually recharacterizes separate property as marital property in
long-term marriages.112  This recharacterization somewhat ameliorates the op-
portunities lost by the Principles’ refusal to label as marital any currently recog-
nized type of separate property.  The specifics, however, limit recharacteriza-
tion’s usefulness.
First, as noted above, the Property Principles specifically exclude spousal
earning capacity, spousal skills, post-dissolution spousal labor, occupational li-
censes, and educational degrees from the concept of property.113  Thus, rechar-
acterization does not affect these potential forms of property.
Second, recharacterization becomes available only in marriages that exceed
a specified duration.114  The Property Principles characteristically defer to the
states to develop a marriage duration rule of statewide application.115  Just as
with compensatory payments, one can predict that male-dominated legislatures
will adopt a rule, if they allow recharacterization at all, that requires marriages
of significant duration before recharacterization begins.
Third, the Property Principles arbitrarily restrict recharacterization to long-
term marriages.  They explain that in lengthy marriages, parties likely expect
that separate assets will provide for joint retirement, a medical crisis of either
spouse, or other personal emergencies.116  As the marriage duration increases,
109. See ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, at 108-09.
110. Id (noting that Rhode Island, Colorado and Pennsylvania classify as marital all increases in
the value of separate property that occur during the marriage).
111. Due to the devastating social impact of the impoverishment of divorced women and de-
pendent children, states might want to make additional financial resources available at divorce.  A
state also may recognize that married couples develop financial plans based on their combined as-
sets.  A wife, for instance, may not maximize her contributions to her retirement account, counting
on the increased value of the husband’s larger retirement account to provide for their joint financial
future.  One spouse may sell a valuable asset, because the couple needs cash and the other spouse’s
separate assets are increasing in value more rapidly.  The spouse that sells expects the increased
value of the other spouse’s assets to offset his or her personal financial sacrifice.
112. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, § 4.18.
113. Id. § 4.07 cmt. a.
114. Id. § 4.18(1).
115. Id. § 4.18(1)(a).
116. Id. § 4.18 cmt. a.
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this expectation also increases.117  The Property Principles further explain that in
lengthy marriages, spouses will likely have made employment decisions or
marital investment decisions that relied upon the availability of separate as-
sets.118  Spousal expectations and reliance then justify recharacterization.  How-
ever, spouses in short-term marriages may well share the same expectations as
spouses in long-term marriages.  A spouse in a short-term marriage also may
make employment and investment decisions based on the availability of the
other spouse’s separate wealth.  The Property Principles ignore these possibili-
ties,119 constraining their potential to alleviate the post-divorce financial depri-
vation of many wives.  Limiting recharacterization to marriages of a specified
duration also invites opportunistic behavior by encouraging a spouse with valu-
able separate property to leave the marriage just before recharacterization be-
gins.  If recharacterization began at marriage, this encouragement would disap-
pear.
Fourth, once a marriage has reached a specified duration only a percentage
of separate property becomes marital.120  The percentage increases as the length
of the marriage increases until at some point all separate property becomes
marital.121  The Principles again charge states with the task of developing a per-
centage rule of statewide application.122  One can only imagine the resistance of
state legislatures to such a percentage rule, suggesting that the recharacteriza-
tion process ultimately will proceed very slowly, if at all.
Fifth, even in marriages of significant duration, separate property received
during the marriage does not become marital property until the spouse has “held”
the separate property for a specified duration.123  If a husband in a twenty-year
marriage inherits several million dollars from his parents, no percentage of that
separate property becomes marital until the husband holds that property for a
specified time period.  Once again, the Principles charge states with the task of
developing a “holding” rule,124 precipitating the same practical and political
problems noted above.  Even more problematic, a spouse can entirely avoid the
recharacterization of gifts or inheritances received during the marriage simply
by giving written notice of such an intent to the other spouse within a specified
time period after the property’s receipt.125  Spouses can plan for twenty years on
the inheritance of one spouse to fund their mutual retirements, yet the spouse
who inherits can violate those expectations simply by declaring his or her intent
to do so.
117. Id.
118. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, § 4.18 cmt. a.
119. Under very limited circumstances, the Principles do provide some relief for spouses in short-
term marriages.  See discussion of compensatory payments at supra note 77.
120. See ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, § 4.18(1)(a).
121. Id. § 4.18(1)(b).
122. Id. § 4.18(1).
123. Id. § 4.18(2).
124. Id.
125. Id. § 4.18(4).  The Court also retains the discretion to refuse to recharacterize property if the
Court explicitly finds that it must preserve the property’s separate character to avoid a substantial
injustice.  Id. § 4.18(6).
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The Property Principles’ widespread deference to states on critical rechar-
acterization rules and a spouse’s ability to avoid entirely the recharacterization
of gifts and inheritances received during the marriage, significantly diminish the
ability of recharacterization to enhance the property available for distribution at
divorce. As a result, recharacterization does not change property distribution
law enough to substantially improve the post-divorce financial situation of most
dependent wives and children.
IV.  ALLOCATIONS OF CUSTODIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CHILDREN
As mentioned above, divorcing mothers frequently trade away their finan-
cial interests in order to secure custody of their children.  An approach to child
custody that honored the commitment of the primary caretaking parent might
discourage this practice and improve the post-divorce financial circumstances of
dependent mothers and their children. The Child Principles offer a presumption
that instructs judges to allocate custodial responsibilities in proportion to the
caretaking functions each parent previously performed for the child.126  At first
blush this presumption seems to honor the caretaking parent, providing some
assurance to the mother of an allocation of custodial responsibility commensu-
rate with her prior commitment.  The broad definition of caretaking functions,127
however, will undoubtedly precipitate factual quarrels, especially in dual-earner
households where sources outside the nuclear family provide much of the care-
taking.
If the father explains a televised football game to his daughter128 while the
mother cooks the family dinner,129 which parent has provided the caretaking?  If
a mother helps with math homework130 while the father launders the family
clothing,131 which parent has provided the caretaking?  Are certain types of
caretaking more important, and therefore more deserving than others?  Very
importantly, the Maintenance Principles provide a strong incentive for fathers to
dispute mothers’ claims of greater caretaking.  If, on the issue of cutsody, a fa-
ther concedes that a mother has performed substantially more of the child care
than he has, he exposes himself to compensatory payments based on caretak-
ing.132  Consequently, the Maintenance Principles encourage disputes regarding
the caretaking functions of each parent.
126. See ALI PRINCIPLES 2000, supra note 8, § 2.09(1).  The Principles also attempt to allocate deci-
sionmaking responsibilities based upon the parents’ respective past participation in child-related
decisionmaking.  Id. § 2.10(1)(b).  Other factors, however, also influence allocation of decisionmaking
responsibilities.  Id. § 2.10(a), (c), (d), (e), (f).
127. Id. § 2.03(6).
128. The father could argue that he performed the caretaking functions of “development and
maintenance of appropriate interpersonal relationships with . . . adults,” id. § 2.03(6)(e), or of  “rec-
reation and play,” Id. § 2.03(6)(a).
129. The mother could argue that she fulfilled the caretaking function of  feeding the child.  Id. §
2.03(6)(a).
130. Supervision of homework is a caretaking function.  Id. § 2.03(6)(d).
131. Id. § 2.03(6)(a) (recognizing caretaking functions that meet the daily physical needs of the
child).
132.  ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, § 5.06.
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Resolving a factual dispute in favor of a mother requires the expenditure of
financial resources the dependent mother frequently does not possess.133  Addi-
tionally, courts frequently value the caretaking that fathers provide more than
that of mothers,134 suggesting that gender bias will influence the actual applica-
tion of this standard.135
If the court cannot determine how parents divided caretaking responsibili-
ties during the marriage, then the court must employ the best interest standard
in allocating these responsibilities.136 Court application of the best interests stan-
dard frequently fails to honor the caretaking mother.137  Moreover in making
custody decisions the Principles allow courts to rely upon the same incompetent
guardians ad litem and others138 who historically have failed to protect mothers’
interests in their children.139  The above suggests that caretaking mothers likely
will not trust the presumption or the default best interests standard to protect
their interests in custody.  They likely will continue to trade financial resources
for custody.
V.  SEPARATION AGREEMENTS
Laws that honor divorce separation agreements make sense only if most
separation agreements will provide adequate financial resources for women and
their dependent children.140  In order for a wife to obtain adequate financial re-
sources during negotiations with her husband, the substantive law must sup-
port her claims.  As argued, application of the substantive law that the ALI pro-
poses likely will not provide the wife with adequate financial resources at
divorce.  Even if we assume that state legislatures have developed entitlement
criteria that adequately protect women, however, enforcement of separation
agreements remains highly problematic.
For the most part, the maintenance and property formulas and presump-
tions offered by the ALI will improve the ability of divorcing spouses and their
lawyers to predict what a court would award at trial.  The predictability of trial
results arguably increases the likelihood that divorce settlement agreements will
reflect existing law.141  Presumably, if both spouses know that a court likely will
133. See Freedom, supra note 1, at 1172-80 nn.78-113, 1200 nn.219-20, 1220 nn.300-03.
134. Id. at 1195-98 nn.196-209, 1225-34 nn.334-77.  
135. The Principles strongly encourage parents to bypass the court and develop their own par-
enting plans for their children, either on their own or in mediation.  ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note
9.  Negotiations, however, will occur in the shadow of the substantive custody law that provides
mothers little protection of their custody interests.  Moreover, shuffling these disputes into the pri-
vate realm of mediation and negotiation creates a context in which parents easily can make custody
and financial trade-offs with little fear of detection or correction by the court. See generally ALI
PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 8, §§ 2.06, 2.08; ALI PRINCIPLES 2000, supra note 8, § 2.07.
136. ALI PRINCIPLES 2000, supra note 8, § 2.09(3).
137. Freedom, supra note 1, at 1192-201 nn.185-224.
138. ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 8, § 2.15.
139. Freedom, supra note 1, 1198-200.
140. Id. at 1153-70.
141. See ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, at 11; Freedom, supra note 1, at 1234 nn.379 & 380.  See
also Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politics of Power, 40 BUFF. L. REV.
441, 522 & n.320 (1992); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
BRYAN - FMT.DOC 09/06/01  2:52 PM
182 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 8:167 2001
award the wife five hundred dollars per month in compensatory payments for
five years, the husband likely will agree to settle for comparable compensatory
payments.  Many factors other than law, however, influence the terms of settle-
ment agreements.
Most wives depend financially upon their husbands.142  Their economic de-
pendency creates innumerable problems in divorce negotiations.  Typically hus-
bands resist paying,143 and judges resist ordering,144 temporary support for wives
during the pendency of the divorce proceeding.  When a wife can no longer
meet her and the children’s basic needs, she typically has difficulty “holding
out” for a settlement agreement that reflects her legal entitlements.145  Many
wives cannot afford competent legal representation,146 nor can they engage in the
expensive discovery necessary to develop their cases.147  A mother with inade-
quate financial resources risks losing custody of her children,148 a factor that
prompts women to trade away financial interests to secure custody.149  Psycho-
logical factors and socialized tendencies also inhibit the ability of many women
to negotiate effectively with their husbands during divorce.150  Moreover many
lawyers exhibit gender bias and encourage women to accept poor settlements in
divorce.151 The formulas the Principles offer for property distribution and spousal
maintenance do nothing to alter these practical circumstances that promote un-
fair settlements.
The Principles recognize152 and attempt to address the danger of unfair set-
tlements in several ways.  The Principles require an enforceable agreement to
comply with general principles of contract law and Chapter 7 of the Principles.153
The contract law that states apply to separation agreements recognizes the un-
conscionability, and resulting unenforceability, of grossly unfair agreements
entered into under duress, coercion, or fraud.154  Application of the unconscion-
ability doctrine historically has provided little relief to women who have entered
142. Freedom, supra note 1, at 1172-73 (explaining the source and the extent of wives’ financial
dependency on husbands).
143. Id. at 1174 & n.87 & 88.
144. Id. at 1173 & n.86.
145. Id. at 1173-74.
146. Id. at 1174-76.
147. Id. at 1174-77.
148. Freedom, supra note 1, at 1178-80.
149. Id.
150. Naive trust, care orientation, low status, depression, low expectations, and ineffective con-
flict resolution styles disadvantage women more than men during divorce negotiations.  Id. at 1180-
1191.  See also Bryan, supra note 141, at 449-90 (exploring the tangible and intangible power dispari-
ties between husbands and wives that disadvantage wives in divorce negotiations and mediation).
151. See Freedom, supra note 1, at 1234-38 & nn.378-403 (exploring how and why lawyers fre-
quently provide divorcing wives with inadequate representation).
152. The Principles recognize that policy concerns (presumably the impoverishment of women
and children are among them) justify some constraints on the parties’ freedom to contact at divorce.
ALI PRINCIPLES 2000, supra note 8, § 7.02.
153. Id. § 7.15.
154. Freedom, supra note 1, at 1240-42.
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unfair settlement agreements.155  Nothing the Principles provide offers to alter
this historical pattern.  Consequently, any protection women have against ineq-
uitable settlement agreements must come from the Agreement Principles.
Section 7.15 addresses the enforceability of separation agreements.156  It re-
quires courts to enforce separation agreements if, prior to accepting the agree-
ment, “each party had full and fair opportunity to be informed of the value of
the parties’ marital and separate assets, each party’s current earning and pros-
pects for future earnings, and the significance of the terms of the agreement.”157
This provision assumes that an “opportunity to be informed” regarding the fi-
nancial circumstances of each spouse and the meaning of the agreement’s terms
protects a weaker spouse.  Two fundamental problems, however, confront this
assumption.
Although information clearly provides power in divorce negotiations,158
this provision only requires an opportunity to obtain information.  If gender bi-
ased and self-interested159 judges continue to decide the enforceability of separa-
tion agreements, we can expect them to find that all women represented by
counsel, no matter how inadequate, had the requisite opportunity to obtain in-
formation.160  We also can expect these judges to find that a woman had the req-
uisite opportunity, when her husband or his attorney testifies that they encour-
aged her to obtain an attorney and she refused.161  In sum, the difficulty lies not in
the provision itself, but in its application.
Second, although information does provide some power in divorce nego-
tiations, information alone does not guarantee a fair result.  A wife may under-
stand completely the financial circumstances of the marriage, yet, as noted
above, lack the requisite power to negotiate effectively with her husband.162
Gender biased and self-interested courts also attribute understanding of an
agreement to wives under egregious circumstances.163
The Principles offer one more protection against unfair settlement agree-
ments.  Section 7.15(2) instructs courts to refuse to enforce settlement agree-
ments that differ substantially from the law that governs compensatory payments
or property disposition and that substantially impair the economic well-being of a
party who has primary or dual residential responsibility for children or has sub-
155. Id. at 1239-70 nn.419, 423-25 & 427-647 (reviewing cases in which judges applied the uncon-
scionability doctrine to separation agreements).
156. ALI PRINCIPLES 2000, supra note 8, § 7.15.
157. Id. § 7.15(1)(c).  The Principles also require that separation agreement satisfy the require-
ments of enforceable contract, id. § 7.15(a), that it be in writing and signed by the parties, or stipu-
lated by the parties before the court, id. § 7.15(b), and that it satisfy other requirements of state law
specially applicable to separation agreements, id. § 7.15 (1)(d).
158. See Freedom, supra note 1, at 1177 & n.103; Bryan, supra note 141, at 447 n.13.
159. Judicial frustration with overcrowded dockets, judicial deference to family privacy, and ju-
dicial distaste for divorce cases, and a pervasive preference for private settlement encourage judges
to accept without serious question unfair divorce settlements.  See Freedom, supra note 1, at 1238-39
n.405-08, 1243 n.428.
160. Id. at 1255 & n.520, 1177 n.103, 1265-69 & n.603, 1267 & n.618.
161. Id. at 1256-57.
162. See supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
163. See Freedom, supra note 2, at 1258-62 & nn.551 & 573.
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stantially fewer economic resources than the other party.164  This provision mim-
ics the unconscionability doctrine, but differs in one important respect.  Gener-
ally unconscionability requires procedural irregularity, i.e., duress, fraud, coer-
cion, as well as substantive unfairness.165  Section 7.15(2) eliminates procedural
irregularity and allows courts to focus exclusively on the substantive fairness of
the separation agreement, making it easier for courts to invalidate unfair agree-
ments.  Historically, however, courts have found extremely lop-sided agree-
ments substantively fair.166  The requirements that an agreement substantially
differ from the law and substantially impair the economic well-being of a party
who has substantially fewer economic resources than the other party actually
invite continuation of this pattern.  Without meaningful intervention or control
over judicial discretion, this pattern undoubtedly will continue.
States cannot rely upon contract doctrine or the Agreement Principles to
protect women from unfair settlement agreements.  Not only do judges have
reprehensible track records in responding to women’s challenges to separation
agreements, most women lack the financial and emotional resources to mount
such challenges in the first instance.167  The important social policies at stake in
divorce cry out for more meaningful intervention in the settlement process.
VI.  CONCLUSION
I regret this rather negative critique of the American Law Institute’s Princi-
ples of the Law of Family Dissolution proposals.  Certainly meaningful reform in
this area is long over-due.  While I doubt that the ALI proposals will signifi-
cantly alter the financial circumstances of divorced women and their dependent
children, the proposals remain important.  In the area of compensatory pay-
ments and property distribution, the ALI moves in the right direction by at-
tempting to limit judicial discretion and to solidify a wife’s entitlements, how-
ever meager.  More importantly the ALI proposals undoubtedly will give rise to
a lively national debate on family dissolution issues.  Hopefully those debates
will generate more radical reform.
164. ALI PRINCIPLES 2000, supra note 8.
165. See supra note and accompanying text.
166. See Freedom, supra note 1, at 1243-70 & nn.599, 603, 618, & 641 (reviewing cases in which
judges refused to set aside lop-sided settlement agreements).
167. Id. at 1243 & n.429.
